Vigilance and Avoidance of Threat in the Eye Movements of Children with Separation Anxiety Disorder by In-Albon, Tina et al.
Vigilance and Avoidance of Threat in the Eye Movements
of Children with Separation Anxiety Disorder
Tina In-Albon & Joe Kossowsky & Silvia Schneider
Published online: 8 October 2009
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009
Abstract The vigilance-avoidance attention pattern is
found in anxious adults, who initially gaze more at
threatening pictures than nonanxious adults (vigilance),
but subsequently gaze less at them than nonanxious adults
(avoidance). The present research, using eye tracking
methodology, tested whether anxious children show the
same pattern. Children with separation anxiety disorder or
no mental disorder viewed pairs of pictures, while the
direction of their gaze was tracked. Each picture pair
showed one picture of a woman separating from a child, the
other picture of a woman reuniting with a child. The results
supported the vigilance-avoidance model in children.
Although the two groups’ gaze direction did not differ
during the first second of viewing, anxious children gazed
significantly more at separating (threatening) pictures than
nonanxious children after a period of 1 s. But after 3 s the
pattern reversed: anxious children gazed significantly less
at the separating pictures than nonanxious children.
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Children suffering from separation anxiety disorder (SAD)
have excessive and unrealistic fears of being separated from
an attachment figure. SAD is one of the most common
mental disorders in childhood, and one of the earliest-
emerging (Cartwright-Hatton et al. 2006; Kessler et al.
2005). SAD is also a risk factor for various mental disorders
in adulthood (Brückl et al. 2007; Lewinsohn et al. 2008).
Theories of childhood anxiety disorders, including SAD, are
generally derived from theories of adult anxiety disorders,
which are predominantly cognitive theories emphasizing
chronically anxious people’s exaggerated concerns about
potential threats (Beck et al. 1985; Kendall 1985; Mathews
and Mackintosh 1998; Williams et al. 1997).
Threat-related cognition includes not only people’s ideas
about threat, such as their expectations of harm, but also the
way people deploy their attention toward threatening
stimuli. Cognitive theories generally predict that because
an anxious person is preoccupied thinking about threats
(i.e., activities or stimuli that are subjectively threatening to
the anxious person but not to a nonanxious person), then he
or she should also display threat-related attentional biases,
such as attending selectively to threatening information and
remaining overly vigilant to detect threat. This vigilance
hypothesis would predict, for example, that anxious people
are on the average quicker than nonanxious people to detect
a threatening stimulus, and more likely, in the presence of
threatening stimuli, to be distracted by them from other
concerns (e.g., Eysenck 1992; Mathews 1990). Such
vigilance has been theorized to be not only an effect of
anxiety, but a reciprocal cause of anxiety because selec-
tively attending to threat leads people to overestimate the
likelihood or imminence of harm.
In the first few seconds after they encounter a threaten-
ing stimulus, anxious adults, anxious children, and people
at risk of developing anxiety disorders show threat-directed
attentional biases, i.e. vigilance. For example, in the
emotional Stroop task people see a colored word that is
sometimes threatening and sometimes non-threatening and
must name its color as quickly as possible. When the word
is threatening, anxious people take longer than their
nonanxious counterparts to name its color, presumably
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because their attention is more distracted by the words’
threatening meaning (e.g., in adults: Mathews and
MacLeod 1985; in children: Martin et al. 1992; Moradi et
al. 1999). Similar results have been found using the dot-
probe paradigm, in which participants are shown two
stimuli, one threatening and the other non-threatening,
displayed on the left and right sides of a screen. After a
delay, the stimuli are replaced by a dot in one of the two
stimuli locations. The time required to indicate on which
side the dot appeared allows inferring where the partic-
ipants’ attention was previously deployed. Chronically
anxious children and adults are faster than their nonanxious
counterparts to indicate the dot’s side when it appears on
the threatening side, and slower than nonanxious people
when the dot appears on the non-threatening side, both
patterns supporting the vigilance hypothesis of attention in
chronic anxiety (e.g., in adults: MacLeod et al. 1986; in
children: Vasey et al. 1995). However, some studies have
failed to find vigilance in anxious children (e.g., with the
Stroop task: Kindt et al. 2003; Schneider et al. 2008; and
with the dot-probe task: Monk et al. 2006; Waters et al.
2004). Nevertheless, enough studies have found it in both
children and adults to prove that the vigilance phenomenon
is real. But anxious people’s attention bias in relation to
threat appears to be more complex than uniformly elevated
vigilance and that complexity calls for caution in evaluating
past emotional Stroop and dot-probe task findings.
The vigilance-avoidance model proposes that anxious
people’s attention to newly-visible threatening stimuli
exhibits both a vigilance bias and its counterpart, an
avoidance bias, depending on the timing of the measure
of attention in relation to the moment the threat stimulus
first becomes visible, i.e., its onset (Mogg and Bradley
1998; Williams et al. 1997). According to this view, both
vigilance and avoidance represent attentional biases pre-
dicted by the psychological meaning of chronic anxiety and
threat (Mogg and Bradley 2006), and from the distinction
between early, largely automatic processes in the detection
of threat, and later, largely controlled thinking processes in
reacting to threat (LeDoux 1996). The vigilance-avoidance
model agrees with the vigilance hypothesis that anxious
individuals are initially more vigilant to detect threat than
nonanxious individuals. But the vigilance-avoidance model
further proposes that having detected an anxiety-provoking
threat, anxious people will avoid it by diverting their
attention from it. The vigilance-avoidance model thus
predicts that anxious people will at first gaze longer at a
newly visible threatening stimulus than nonanxious people,
but thereafter the pattern will reverse and anxious people
will gaze less at the threatening stimulus than nonanxious
people. The vigilance-avoidance pattern has important
possible implications for the development and maintenance
of fears and anxiety. If overly vigilant gaze increases
anxiety by leading people to overperceive threat and hence
to overestimate danger, then the subsequent avoidant gaze
could maintain or increase anxiety by preventing the person
from realizing that their perception of threat is exaggerated
and by preventing the person from extinguishing the
anxiety by exposing themselves to the threat rather than
avoiding it. An anxiety-maintaining effect of gaze avoid-
ance would be consistent with a large body of research
showing that avoidant behavior in anxious people tends to
maintain their anxiety, whereas counter-avoidant behavior
and counter-avoidant thinking and imagining tend to reduce
their anxiety (e.g., Grawe et al. 1994). If the vigilance-
avoidance model is correct, then past experimental failures
in finding attention biases might have arisen not from the
absence of bias, but because the experimenters sampled
people’s attention at a moment when bias was not taking
place. The vigilance-avoidance model is not specific as to
whether there should be an initial orienting period when
anxious and nonanxious adults or children will fail to show
vigilance, nor as to the exact timing of the transition point
from vigilance to avoidance, a point when attention to
threat will not differ between anxious and nonanxious
people. The transition should presumably occur when
people’s recognition and controlled thinking come into
play. Therefore, measuring anxious and non-anxious
people’s attention over time and testing the vigilance-
avoidance model requires monitoring their attention at
frequent intervals over the first several seconds after
threatening stimuli come into view. The emotional Stroop
task appears limited to capturing attention biases very early
after the onset of the threatening word, as the participant
names its color as quickly as possible. The dot-probe
paradigm allows for the delaying of the dot-probe until
several seconds after the new threat stimulus comes into
view, so that by systematically varying the delay the
technique can be used to map the time course of people’s
attention to a new threatening stimulus. However, such
research would require many presentations of threat stimuli
with varying delays of the dot-probe, a procedure that is
feasible but cumbersome and has not as yet been done with
children.
A superior method of testing the possibly extended and
varying time course of anxious people’s attention biases in
relation to threatening stimuli is eye tracking (Bögels and
Mansell 2004). In eye tracking, the individual simply views
stimuli on a screen, while the assessor unobtrusively and
continuously records the exact position of the person’s eye
gaze. The participant needs do nothing but look at the
stimuli. The assumption is that the direction of gaze is
closely linked to what is being attended to (Just and
Carpenter 1976). With eye tracking, anxious people’s
attentional biases can be measured by having them view
threatening or nonthreatening stimuli presented singly or in
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contrasting (or opposing) pairs, with gaze time at the
threatening stimulus serving as the measure of attention to
threat.
Eye tracking research with anxious adults has tended to
support the vigilance-avoidance model (Garner et al. 2006;
Mogg et al. 2000; Pflugshaupt et al. 2005; Rinck and
Becker 2006), although some studies found only partial
support for it, finding avoidance but not vigilance (e.g.,
Hermans et al. 1999; Rohner 2002). Most studies that found
a vigilance effect using pairs of stimuli, one threatening and
the other neutral, which MacLeod and Mathews (1991)
judged to be more likely to show the effect than would
singly-presented stimuli. The authors suggest that the
cognitive effect of anxiety may be described as a priority
for the processing of certain stimuli. Because of the limited
processing capacity, this has a negative effect on the
processing of other information.
It is important and remains to be seen if children display
the same vigilance-avoidance pattern as adults. Monk et al.
(2006) found that the relationship between anxiety and
attentional biases for threat varies across development, a
finding that necessitates examining threat-related attentional
biases directly in children and adolescents. The vigilance-
avoidance model has not previously been investigated in
anxious children, nor has children’s attention toward threat
been evaluated yet with eye tracking methods. Adult
studies have typically examined gaze toward simultaneous-
ly presented pairs of stimuli, one of which is threatening
and the other neutral. Given that children are more likely
than adults to experience fatigue, we found it advantageous
to make the pairs of stimuli as contrasting as possible, thus
pairing threatening images with their opposites. Studies
assessing adults with anxiety disorders mostly found an
immediate vigilance effect. However, adults and children
could differ, for example given children’s lesser cognitive-
perceptual maturity. Therefore, the vigilance effect may not
occur as immediate as in adults but with a short delay of
time, in which children process the stimuli. However, since
there is at current no research on this issue, we were not
able to formulate a stricter hypothesis. We therefore decided
to predict that the vigilance may occur either immediately
or after an initial orientation period.
Our hypothesis was that anxious children would show the
vigilance-avoidance pattern. Children with SAD and children
with no disorder viewed a series of pairs of photographs, one
of which depicted a child separating from an adult woman
(the threat picture), the other a child reuniting with an adult
woman. We measured the duration of the children’s gaze at
each of the two pictures during the first 4 s each pair was in
view. We predicted that the children with SAD would
demonstrate vigilance either immediately or after an initial
orienting period by gazing longer at the separating pictures
than the nonanxious children, but would thereafter demon-
strate avoidance by gazing less at the separating pictures than
the nonanxious children.
Method
Participants
Participants were 23 children with a primary DSM-IV-TR
diagnosis of SAD (13 girls and 10 boys) and 17 nonanxious
control children (6 girls and 11 boys). The mean age of the
children with SAD was 9.91 years (SD=1.44, Range=8–13)
and of the nonanxious control children 10.29 (SD=1.40,
Range 8–13). The groups were comparable with respect to
age (t(38)=0.84, p=0.41) and gender (χ2(1, N=40)=1.77,
p=0.18). The sample size provided 87% power to detect a
medium effect size (Cohen’s d=0.50). Of the children in the
SAD group, 10 (43.5%) met criteria for one additional
clinical disorder (generalized anxiety disorder, social phobia,
specific phobia, or insomnia). The nonanxious control group
never experienced any mental disorders when assessed with
the Kinder-DIPS. The children with SAD were participants
in a cognitive-behavioral treatment study of SAD at the
University of Basel, Switzerland, but had not completed any
treatment program before taking part in this study. The
children were recruited by referral from child health
professionals and by parents who self-referred their child in
response to announcements on the Internet, in local news-
papers and magazines, in schools, and in family centers in
the Basel area. Nonanxious children were paid for participa-
tion. The SAD and nonanxious children were markedly
dissimilar in their level of separation anxiety, as shown by
nonoverlapping distributions in their scores on the parent
report of SAD, to be described in detail in the “Measures”
and “Experimental Checks” subsection of the “Method”
section, below.
Procedure
Children and their parents gave written consent to partic-
ipate in the research project, approved by the Ethics
Committee of Basel, Switzerland, which informed them of
the child’s right to withdraw at any time. No child withdrew
from participation. Children were tested individually in a
quiet room with the assistance of a graduate student. Both
the child and the parent completed a diagnostic interview
and questionnaire measures that were gathered to confirm
that the two groups differed in chronic anxiety as intended.
Measures
Diagnoses of Mental Illness To examine the children’s
current or past DSM-IV-TR diagnoses, we conducted a
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structured interview of each child and, separately, of each
child’s parents (i.e., either the mother or father or both
together). Children’s mental illnesses were diagnosed using
a structured interview, the Diagnostic Interview for Mental
Disorders in Children and Adolescents (Kinder-DIPS;
Schneider et al. 2009), which has alternate forms for child
and parent. The structured interview assesses all anxiety
disorders, depression, attention-deficit hyperactivity disor-
der, oppositional defiant disorder, sleep disorders, eating
disorders, and elimination disorders. The Kinder-DIPS has
good validity and reliability for anxiety disorders (child
version: kappa=0.88; parent version: kappa=0.85) and
other axis I disorders (child version, kappa=0.48–0.88,
parent version, kappa=0.85–0.94; Schneider et al. 2009).
Diagnoses were based on composite information from the
two separate child and parent interviews. Doctoral students
in clinical child psychology were first systematically
trained in conducting the interviews. SAD was diagnosed
if either interviewer rendered the diagnosis.
Separation Anxiety, Child Rating Children completed the
Separation Anxiety Inventory for children (SAI-C; Scalbert,
M., In-Albon, T., & Schneider, S. (2006). Psychometrische
Gütekriterien des Trennungsangst-Inventars für Kinder
[Psychometric properties of the Separation Anxiety Inven-
tory]. Unpublished Master Thesis, University of Basel.), a
questionnaire consisting of 12 items assessing the degree to
which the rater avoids 12 different separation situations.
The stem of each item is “Because I am anxious, I’m
avoiding… e.g., going to school, sleeping in my own bed”.
The psychometric properties of the SAI-C were good,
including its internal consistency (alpha=0.85), its test-
retest reliability (r=0.84), and its construct validity cover-
ing all the major features commonly used to define
separation anxiety disorder (Scalbert et al. 2006).
Separation Anxiety, Parent Rating Parents rated the Sepa-
ration Anxiety Inventory for parents (SAI-P; Brugger, M.,
Schneider, S., & In-Albon, T. (2006). Psychometrische
Gütekriterien des Trennungsangst-Inventars für Kinder,
Elternversion [Psychometric properties of the Separation
Anxiety Inventory, parent version]. Unpublished Master
Thesis, University of Basel.), which assesses the parent’s
view of the degree to which the child avoids the same 12
separation situations as in the child version. Internal
consistency of the current sample was alpha=0.88.
Manifest Anxiety, Child Rating Children rated their mani-
fest anxiety by completing the Revised Children’s Manifest
Anxiety Scale-Child version (RCMAS; Reynolds and
Richmond 1978; German Version; Boehnke et al. 1986), a
self-report measure with 37 items. Cronbach’s alpha for the
German version of the current sample was 0.98.
Manifest Anxiety, Parent Rating Parents rated their child’s
manifest anxiety by completing the Revised Children’s
Manifest Anxiety Scale-Parent version (RCMAS-P; Pina et
al. 2001; German version: Schneider, S., Adornetto, C., &
Blatter, J. (2004). Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety
Scale-Parent version (RCMAS). Unpublished manuscript,
University of Basel.), which has items identical to those of
the child rating version except that each item’s stem was
changed from “I…” to “My child…”. Internal consistency
of the German version and the current sample for the total
anxiety scores were 0.86.
Depression The children indicated their level of depressed
mood by completing the Children’s Depression Inventory
(CDI; Kovacs 1981; German Version DIKJ, Stiensmeier-
Pelster et al. 2000), a self-report measure of depression for
children and adolescents. Depressed mood is often associ-
ated with chronic anxiety among both children and adults.
The CDI includes 26 items sampling the cognitive,
affective and behavioral signs of depression; children
indicate whether each item characterizes themselves during
the past 2 weeks. The German version of the CDI in the
current sample had an internal consistency of 0.96.
Children’s State Anxiety Because high levels of state anxiety
are associated with increased threat perception and lower
threat thresholds (MacLeod 1990; Muris et al. 2003), we
assessed children’s level of state anxiety before and after the
eye tracking procedure. Using paper and pencil, each child
indicated his or her current anxiety on a 0–10 point Likert
scale ranging from “I am not at all anxious” to “I am very
anxious.” The purpose was to allow judging whether
experimental effects might have been affected by state
anxiety differences, not only by chronic anxiety differences,
between the two groups of children.
Assessment of Vigilance and Avoidance
Stimulus Materials: Separating and Reuniting Photographs Be-
cause we investigated a homogeneous group of children
with respect to SAD, we could use images of a woman
separating from a child as threat stimuli for all anxious
children, an action children with SAD find threatening and
anxiety-provoking, and we could use images of a woman
reuniting with a child as potent non-threat stimuli. A match
between stimuli and the specific anxiety disorder is
recommended by Mogg and Bradley (1998) and Öhman
et al. (2001) for researching biased attentional processes in
anxiety. Attentional biases are more likely in situations that
involve the presentation of multiple stimuli competing for
attention (e.g., MacLeod and Mathews 1991). Therefore,
we created color photographs representing separating
situations and reuniting situations. Separating photographs
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depicted a child and a woman, apparently the child’s
mother, separating from one another, e.g., by the woman
leaving home or driving away in a car. Reuniting pictures
depicted the child and woman greeting and embracing one
another. The child in the photograph was either a boy or a
girl, to allow matching the gender of the child in the
photograph to the gender of the participant. Children in the
pictures were between 8 and 10 years of age. Thus, children
in the pictures were at a comparable age as the children we
investigated in this study.
Pretesting of the Stimulus Photographs The intended
apparent difference between the separating and reuniting
photographs was pretested in a preliminary study with 253
unselected school children, none of who took part in the
present study (In-Albon et al. 2008). In the preliminary
study children rated a set of 15 separating and 15 reuniting
pictures using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from “1 =
definite reuniting” to “9 = definite separation”. The pretest
children correctly rated the pictures at near opposite ends of
the separation scale (reuniting photographs, M=1.33, SD=
0.74; separating photographs, M=7.91, SD=1.5). The
pictures for the present experiment were selected from the
preliminary set and had been rated similarly by girls and
boys in the preliminary study (In-Albon et al. 2008).
Final Eight Stimulus Slides Having pretested the photo-
graphs as effective images of separating and reuniting, we
then used the pretested photographs in creating a set of
8 slides, each slide containing two target photographs,
displayed left and right, one depicting a separating scene
and the other a reuniting scene, matched for complexity and
brightness. Shown in Fig. 1 is an example of a slide. The
left-right position of the separating and reuniting photo-
graphs was counterbalanced randomly across trials. All
pictures had a size of 600×450 pixels and were presented
on a computer screen with a resolution of 1,024×768
pixels.
Eye Tracking Apparatus We tracked participants’ gaze
direction with the Tobii 1750 table-mounted eye tracker
(Tobii Technology AB. (http://www.tobii.com, Sweden),
which consists of a computer screen (an LCD flat panel
display) with a camera and infrared LED optics embedded
beneath it. Each stimulus slide containing a pair of
photographs was displayed on the computer screen while
data recording participants’ gaze direction were collected
for both eyes simultaneously on an average of every 20 ms
(i.e., 50 Hz) and at an accuracy of less than 0.5° (bias
error). This eye tracker is characterized by the unobtrusive-
ness of its hardware, which promotes natural behavior by
not restricting participants with helmets or head/chest-rests,
nor does it require removal of eyeglasses (In-Albon and
Schneider 2009). The software package “ClearView”,
provided by Tobii, was used with the Tobii 1750 to
examine the child’s eye movements by means of a post-
hoc analysis of the visual fixations within the two target
pictures. The eye tracking data were then examined in
terms of fixations recorded within these pictures (areas of
interest). Fixations were counted if they were longer than
20 ms on the defined area of interest. Mean latencies for
each picture type were calculated after excluding latencies
exceeding 3 SD above each participant’s mean.
Eye Tracking Procedure Participants were seated approxi-
mately 60 cm away from the computer monitor. The
instruction given to the child was: “Your task will be to
look at the pictures on the screen until they disappear; move
your eyes, but not your head”. An experimenter who was
unaware of whether the child had SAD sat in the room with
the child to ensure that the child paid attention to the
screen, and that the eye tracker was working properly. After
calibration, a single picture pair was shown for 4 s. Prior to
each picture display, a central fixation cross was shown for
1,000 ms in order to catch the participants’ attention. The
intertrial interval varied randomly within each block of
trials between 750 ms and 1,250 ms. The pairs of pictures
were presented in counter balanced order across trails, one
on the left side and the other on the right side of the screen.
Each child underwent 9 blocks of trials, with each block
containing 8 trials (i.e., eight 4-second presentations of a
picture pair). The paradigm lasted about 20 min.
The procedure effectively gathered eye tracking data.
Both groups of children spent an average of 66% of their
time looking at the photographs, i.e., either at the separating
or the reuniting photograph, and the two groups did not
differ significantly in total photograph viewing time. The
balance of 34% was spent viewing elsewhere than the
pictures. This 34% did not include errors of eye tracking
accuracy.
Experimental Checks
Intergroup Differences in Chronic Anxiety The two child
groups differed as expected in separation anxiety. Presented
in Table 1 are the mean scores of SAD and nonanxious
children on the various questionnaire measures. Children
with SAD scored significantly higher on the disorder-
specific Separation Anxiety Inventory than nonanxious
children, including both the Child form (SAI-C) and Parent
form (SAI-P). In the parent completed RCMAS-P measure,
children with SAD were rated as being significantly more
anxious.
Ratings of Photograph Content, Valence, and Arousal After
the eye tracking procedure, we had each participant rate
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each of the 16 photographs on the 8 stimulus slides for the
extent to which it showed a separating scene or a reuniting
scene, using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“definite
reuniting”) to 9 (“definite separating”). In addition, partic-
ipants rated each picture’s valence and arousal using the
Self-Assessment Manikin, a pictorial 9-point scale (SAM;
Bradley and Lang 1994) ranging from “very pleasant” to
“very unpleasant” for valence from “excited” to “calm” for
arousal. Children were told to make a written mark for
valence and then for arousal either on or between the
anchoring figures for each scale.
Like the children in the preliminary check reported
above, the present participants rated the pictures’ content
appropriately as separating or reuniting. Their mean
valence, arousal, and picture ratings are presented in
Table 2. Low scores indicate that the child rated the picture
as reuniting and high scores indicate that the child rated the
picture as separating. The two groups’ ratings did not differ
from one another for either type of photograph.
The two groups of children rated the photographs’ valence
and arousal as expected. A two-way (Group × Picture Type)
mixed ANOVAwas performed to check whether childrenwith
SAD reporter higher levels of arousal and valence, irrespec-
tive of picture content. For both the valence ratings and the
arousal ratings, the Group × Picture Type interaction was not
significant, (valence ratings: F(1, 37)=3.17, p=0.08; arousal
ratings: F(1, 37)=0.23, p=0.63). Thus, children with SAD
were not generally more aroused by the photographs than
nonanxious children, and the group differences in their
ratings for each picture type can be attributed to picture
content. Separate analyses of each picture type showed that,
as expected, children with SAD rated separating photo-
graphs’ valence as significantly more unpleasant than did
nonanxious children, t(37)=2.88, p<0.01. Children with
SAD found separating photographs more arousing than did
the nonanxious children, t(37)=3.08, p<0.01, as well as the
reuniting photographs, t(37)=3.07, p<0.01. In short, the
photographs elicited an emotional response, especially in
children with SAD.
State Anxiety in Relation to Eye Tracking State anxiety
assessed on the 0–10 scale before and after eye tracking
procedure was very low in nonanxious children (M=0.07,
SD=0.26) and in children with SAD (M=0.24, SD=0.54)
and it remained low after the procedure in both nonanxious
children (M=0.00, SD=0.00) and children with SAD (M=
Reuniting SeparatingFig. 1 Separation-related
photographs (reuniting,
separating)
Table 1 Mean Anxiety and Depression of Children with SAD and of Nonanxious Children
Questionnaire Range SAD Nonanxious t(34) p
M SD M SD
SAI-C 0–48 22.9 9.5 8.1 8.8 4.69 <0.001
SAI-P 0–48 26.3 9.5 7.8 6.6 6.67 <0.001
RCMAS-C 0–37 11.7 7.2 8.1 5.0 1.64 = 0.11
RCMAS-P 0–37 13.1 4.6 5.5 4.6 4.62 <0.001
CDI 0–52 10.8 6.9 7.9 6.0 1.28 = 0.21
SAI Separation Anxiety Inventory, Child and Parent version; CASI Child Anxiety Sensitivity Index; RCMAS-C Reynolds Children’s Manifest
Anxiety Scale, Child version; RCMAS-P Reynolds Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, Parent version; CDI Children’s Depression Inventory
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0.23, SD=0.69). A 2×2 ANOVA of these means yielded no
significant effects or interactions, F(1, 34)=0.15, p=0.7.
This check thus established that any difference in the eye
gaze pattern that might emerge between the two groups of
children are not likely be attributable to differences in the
children’s state anxiety aroused by the procedure itself.
Results
Vigilance and Avoidance in Children’s Gaze
The findings strongly supported our hypothesis that the
time course of relative attention allocation toward threat
would differ between chronically anxious children and
nonanxious children, and in particular that anxious children
would deploy their attention first vigilantly, then avoidantly,
as the vigilance-avoidance model predicts. The extent of
each child’s attention to threat was calculated as the percent
of time the child spent looking at separating pictures as a
function of total time he or she spent looking at either the
separating or the reuniting picture. The means of these bias
scores1 by each child group over the 4 s of viewing time,
subdivided into eight 500 ms intervals, are presented
graphically in Fig. 2. To test whether attention to threat is
biased in children with SAD, we analyzed these means
using a 2 (Child Group: SAD and nonanxious) × 8 (Time
Interval, ending at: 500 ms, 1,000 ms, 1,500 ms, 2,000 ms,
2,500 ms, 3,000 ms, 3,500 ms, and 4,000 ms) mixed
ANOVA with repeated measures on the Time Interval
factor. The degrees of freedom and significance levels were
adjusted according to the Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
The results showed a significant main effect of Time
Interval, F(4.1, 141)=2.63, p<0.05, and, of key impor-
tance, a significant Child Group × Time Interval interaction,
F(4.1, 506.9)=3.32, p<0.01, the latter confirming that the
children with SAD allocated their attention to threat over
time differently than did the nonanxious children. The
meaning of this significant interaction and its support for
the vigilance-avoidance model are evident from visual
inspection of Fig. 2. The Figure shows that in the first
second the two groups did not differ in their gaze patterns,
but from 1 to 2 sec, the children with SAD showed the
vigilance pattern by gazing relatively longer at threatening
stimuli than did nonanxious children. Then between 2 and
3 sec the groups did not differ. Then between about 3 and
4 sec the children with SAD showed the avoidance pattern
by gazing relatively shorter at threatening stimuli than did
nonanxious children.
The preceding analyses were based on bias scores
calculated as the relative amount of time each child gazed
at the two pictures. It is also of interest to see each group’s
absolute viewing time separately at each type of photo-
graph, separating and reuniting, at each time interval,
because these absolute scores provide an alternative means
of testing the vigilance-avoidance model. Displayed in
Table 3 are the mean milliseconds of gaze by children with
SAD and by nonanxious children at the separating photo-
graphs (the upper half of Table 3) and at the reuniting
photographs (the lower half of Table 3), by time periods
after picture onset. The last line of the upper half and of the
lower half of Table 3 present the effect sizes of the
comparison between child groups at each time interval.
The complete 2 (Child Group: SAD and nonanxious) × 2
(Picture Type: separating or reuniting) × 8 (Time Interval:
ending at 500 ms, 1,000 ms, 1,500 ms, 2,000 ms, 2,500 ms,
3,000 ms, 3,500 ms, and 4,000 ms) ANOVA of the means
in Table 3, with repeated measures on the Time Interval and
Picture Type factors, yielded a significant three-way
interaction, F(4.4, 154.9)=3.20, p=0.01, which is consis-
tent with the significant two-way interaction of the relative
bias scores reported in the preceding paragraph, as both
indicate that the time course of attention to the two
photographs differed between the two child groups, with
the means showing the patterns of difference to be
consistent with the vigilance-avoidance model.
The covariates gender and age did not explain a
significant proportion of the variance.
Table 2 Mean Picture, Valence, and Arousal Ratings of Separating and Reuniting Pictures by SAD and Nonanxious Child Groups
Picture rating Valence rating Arousal rating
Picture SAD Nonanxious SAD Nonanxious SAD Nonanxious
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Separating 8.3 1.3 8.1 1.2 **5.6 2.2 3.4 2.5 **6.4 2.0 8.2 1.5
Reuniting 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.7 2.1 1.4 1.4 0.9 **7.1 2.1 8.7 0.6
Picture rating: 1 = definitely reuniting, 9 = definitely separation, Valence rating: 1 = very pleasant, 9 = very unpleasant; Arousal rating: 1 = excited,
9 = calm, *Indicating significant t tests, p<0.05, **p<0.001
1 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this
suggestion.
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Direction of Initial Gaze
The first picture fixations were recorded for each child. Both
groups first fixated on reuniting photographs. Children with
SAD first fixated on reuniting photographs in 76.2% of
trials, while nonanxious children first fixated on reuniting
photographs in 76.5% of trials, thus revealing no significant
differences between the groups in initial gaze direction.
Discussion
Children with SAD are, after an initial second, vigilant for
stimuli they find threatening, but once they detect a threatening
stimulus, they quickly become avoidant of it. The children
might spend the first second judging the meaning of these
pictures. After the initial second, children with SAD spent
more time than did nonanxious children looking at the
separating (threatening) photographs, but after 3 s, children
with SAD spent less time than did nonanxious children
looking at the separating photographs. This finding is con-
sistent with findings with anxious adults, and it strongly
supports the vigilance-avoidance model. Of particular impor-
tance is that it shows that the vigilance-avoidance anxious gaze
pattern is evident already in preadolescent children with SAD.
Therefore, our results point to a remarkable continuity in
attentional processes associated with anxiety across the life-
span, highlighting the importance of cognitive processes for
emotional disorders. Because of the potential long-term impact
that attentional bias might have on the trajectory of disorders,
information processing is of particular interest in children.
We believe this is the first study to empirically test the
vigilance-avoidance model in children with anxiety disorders,
and the first to study the visual attention of children with SAD
using eye tracking. It is also the first study on attentional bias
in SAD children to examine a diagnostically homogeneous
group, and to empirically validate separation-related pictorial
images as stimuli. Salient and disorder-specific stimulus
materials are important conditions in the assessment of
cognitive biases. Previously, most studies assessing cognitive
biases in children with anxiety disorders have used diagnos-
tically inhomogeneous groups and exposed them to general
threatening material (e.g., Bögels et al. 2003; Bögels and
Zigterman 2000; Dalgleish et al. 2003; Muris et al. 2000;
Vasey et al. 1995; Waters et al. 2004) instead of material
specific to the anxiety disorder each participant suffers from
(e.g., In-Albon et al. 2008; In-Albon et al. 2009). However,
the content of people’s dysfunctional ideas, interpretations,
and expectations is thought to be specific to the stimuli or
activities each person fears (Beck et al. 1985). Insight into
the disorder-specific cognitive and attentional biases of
children with anxiety disorders is needed to better understand
those disorders, and to develop more effective treatments
than those currently available (In-Albon and Schneider
2007). Because the vigilance-avoidance model has been
found in adults with other anxiety disorders, the present
results might therefore well be generalizable to children with
other anxiety disorders. Of course, one cannot be certain of
this fact until the vigilance-avoidance model has been
actually investigated in children with other anxiety disorders
or other disorders. Studies on the specificity of the attentional
bias in children are rare and have so far yielded unclear
results (Dalgleish et al. 2003; Kindt et al. 2003). Therefore,
in a first step, the vigilance-avoidance model was investi-
gated in a group of children with the same anxiety diagnosis
in comparison to children without mental disorders. Clearly,
the next step would consist of including a second clinical
group to test for specificity of the results.
Unlike studies by Pflugshaupt et al. (2005) and Rinck
and Becker (2006) with adults that observed the vigilance
effect from the first onset of the threat stimulus, we found
the vigilance effect only after 1 s had elapsed. The children
50
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with SAD showed no vigilance bias during the first second
of viewing the stimuli, meaning that the percent of their
gaze time spent looking at the separating (threatening)
stimuli did not differ from that of nonanxious children. A
salient possible explanation lies in the complexity of our
photographs. Eye movement studies of the vigilance-
avoidance hypothesis with anxious adults frequently inves-
tigated spider phobic people and used spider pictures as
stimuli (Pflugshaupt et al. 2005; Rinck, and Becker 2006).
Our pictures depicted interpersonal interactions, the content
of which arguably require more time to interpret. A second
possible factor that we cannot rule out is that the initial lack
of attention bias is a developmental difference between
anxious adults’ and anxious children’s attentional and gaze
control processes.
After the initial period, children with SAD displayed the
expected vigilance effect, first lingering on the separation
photographs. The prolonged early gaze time toward threat
observed both in anxious adults and anxious children might
reflect a kind of a reassurance seeking behavior. Yiend and
Mathews (2001) suggested that when only limited infor-
mation about a threat is available, highly anxious people are
more likely to attend to the threat location and may thus
want to learn more about it, to be sure to identify whether it
is dangerous or not. But after this early rapid vigilance,
anxious people show a later relative avoidance of threat
stimuli compared with nonanxious people, possibly reflect-
ing a cognitively controlled instrumental act to reduce the
distress threat stimuli evoke in them.
In keeping with the vigilance-avoidance model’s label-
ing and with the methods that have been used to test it, we
call the lesser gaze time at threatening stimuli by anxious
than nonanxious children “avoidance”. In this approach, the
nonanxious children provide the standard of what is normal
or usual, compared to which a significant deviation is either
more than normally vigilant or more than normally
avoidant. Important to future research on biases in attention
to threat will be exploring the role of controlled versus
automatic processes in vigilance and avoidance.
The vigilance-avoidance pattern has been proposed as a
key factor in maintaining anxiety. Avoidance is held to
maintain anxiety by preventing the individual from evaluating
vague stimuli sufficiently to perceive that they are not threat-
ening, and from remaining exposed to threatening stimuli long
enough to habituate to, or extinguish, their fear-arousing
properties. We are currently investigating whether the
vigilance-avoidance pattern in children with SAD changes
from before to after treatment with cognitive-behavioral
therapy.
Results of the check of how the children perceived the
pictures indicated that the separation pictures trigger an
emotional state, especially in children with SAD. The ratings
of the pictures confirmed that the children were accurate inTa
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correctly identifying the pictures’ content. Children with SAD
rated the separating photographs as significantly more
unpleasant and more arousing than did nonanxious children,
and the pictures children saw as positive (reuniting) were
more pleasant and calming than were pictures seen as negative
(separating). These results indicate that the stimulus material
was valid, but future studies should exclude that attention
biases are specific to threatening stimuli and cannot be found
for negative pictures in general in children with SAD or other
anxiety disorders. An intriguing possible future research
methodology is the use of videos.
The present results indicate that attentional biases regard-
ing threat are present in children, but not from where these
biases come. One possibility for the development of cognitive
biases is that genetically based individual difference variables
increase the proneness to cognitive biases (Hadwin et al.
2006). The personality trait neuroticism and the temperament
style behavioral inhibition have been proposed as etiological
factors, an association between neuroticism and attention
bias was found in a cross-sectional study (Hadwin et al.
1997; see also Lonigan et al. 2004).
Field (2006) showed that fear information creates atten-
tional biases toward a threatening stimulus in children and
that fear information itself might be sufficient to create
anxiety (Field and Lawson 2003; 2008).
The current findings need to be considered in light of some
limitations. Despite the advantages of the eye tracking
method, humans can voluntary dissociate their attention from
the foveal direction of gaze. An eye tracker cannot track the
covert movement of visual attention. It remains to be
examined whether covert components of attention would alter
our estimate of the vigilance-avoidance attentional processes
revealed by overt eye movements. An advantage of future
research of having a larger sample size would permit testing if
there are any age effects in vigilance-avoidance.
The present findings of a different pattern of attention
allocation in children with SAD compared to nonanxious
children support the vigilance-avoidance model. This might
have clinical treatment implications for anxious children,
because biased attention is widely theorized to affect
development of diverse mental disorders in children. Eye
tracking methodology in particular is a promising new
method of assessing, and potentially even of treating,
cognitive biases in children, as it is easy to administer and
visual images can be used as stimuli, which are more age-
appropriate for young children than are words.
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